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Puripetal Force in the Charitable Field
This article sets out to clarify the wide range of relationships between reli-
gions and humanitarian traditions as ideological movements, taking Islam as 
a case study. It postulates that the concept of the “sacred,” which is culturally 
restricted, is a special case of boundary maintenance or “purism.” Metaphori-
cally, “puripetal force” is defined as a tendency common to all ideological 
systems, a resistance to social entropy or anomie. The importance of purity in 
Islamic doctrine is well attested, but within that wider sphere we may iden-
tify the specially puritan version of Islam known as Wahhabi-Salafism. As for 
humanitarianism and philanthropy, these occupy in the West a “space” pro-
tected by special laws and conceived of as untainted by either politics or eco-
nomics. Within the wider sphere of humanitarianism we may locate a more 
concentrated form in Dunantism, which has underpinned the world view and 
habitus of the International Committee of the Red Cross. This article out-
lines how the policies and programs of various Islamic charity and welfare 
organizations—originating in Britain, Indonesia, and Saudi-Arabia—interact 
differentially with on the one hand Islamic doctrines and on the other hand 
humanitarian traditions. Finally, it is suggested that this explanatory model 
could equally be applied to Christian and other religious traditions, with the 
concluding thought that the common ground between the institutions of 
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In 2009 I paid a visit with a Swiss colleague to the president of an Islamic chari-table committee in the Palestinian West Bank, a Fatah nominee, shortly after a 
reorganization and centralization of the West Bank zakat (the Qur’anic tithe) com-
mittees that had been effected at the end of 2007 following the Fatah/Hamas split 
(Schaeublin 2009, 49). The president said that “the new zakat committees are 
like a pool of water” and that one drop of ink would pollute the whole pool. The 
drop of ink was anybody with links to Hamas. 
The quest for purity
This article will compare many different types of purity seeking. It is 
itself an attempt to clarify the muddy no-man’s-land between religion and humani-
tarianism. I assume as axiomatic that all organized disaster relief is informed by 
values, whether publicly stated or implicit, that furnish some kind of moral order 
in the face of unlimited human needs. Some years ago, contributors to an edited 
book on this subject were asked to suggest a snappy title. I suggested “Pure Aid” 
but this was turned down in favor of “Sacred Aid,” under which title the book was 
duly published (Barnett and Stein eds. 2012). This leaves me free to use the idea 
of “pure aid” to animate this article, which will argue that purity-seeking—which I 
shall call “puripetal force”—is a more fundamental concept than sacralization and 
hence more useful for comparative analysis. Purity is at its most basic the main-
tenance of boundaries. Whereas in Newtonian physics “centripetal force” draws 
bodies towards a central point, and is always balanced by centrifugal force, we 
may envisage puripetal force as a culturally universal resistance to social entropy or 
anomie.
“Sacred” is a word with complex connotations. It was the linchpin of Dur-
kheim’s theory of religion, referring to special kinds of beliefs and ritual activity 
that promote social cohesion, as opposed to the “profane,” by which he meant 
the mundane or everyday. It is true that some commonalities can be observed in 
religious spaces and timetables all over the world. But a number of social anthro-
pologists have questioned the cross-cultural validity of the sacred-profane distinc-
tion that originated in ancient Rome, arguing that it is “vague and ill-defined” 
(Evans-Pritchard 1960, 12) and “unusable” (Stanner 1967, 229) and may have lim-
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ited usefulness even in interpreting the Christian tradition. In Arabic, the same 
verbal root ḥaruma, to be forbidden, gives us al-ḥaramain, the two most sacred 
places in Islam, Mecca, and Medina; the ḥarīm, that part of a house reserved for 
women; and ḥarām, prohibited actions such as gambling. In Buddhist thought, 
the nearest we find is the distinction between samsara, the Conditioned, and nir-
vana, the Unconditioned, but these are both categories of dharma that merge into 
one another, so that they cannot be called a mutually exclusive dichotomy (Orrú 
and Wang 1992, 54–58); and moreover in Buddhist practice we find great emphasis 
on the salvific possibilities of everyday actions. 
The quest for purity is, I suggest, a universal component of ideological systems. 
My intention here is to use the concept to enable us to avoid using “religion” or 
“faith” as analytical terms, thus sidestepping the difficulty which these terms pres-
ent, considered by some scholars such as Jonathan Z. Smith (1982) and Timothy 
Fitzgerald (2007) to be insuperable. I am not of course claiming that religion 
can be reduced to purism—though the values of chastity, abstinence, asceticism, 
and general obedience to rules may be loosely called “puritan” and probably have 
homologous tendencies in all religious traditions. There is a “paradox of purity,” 
as pointed out by the literary critic Kenneth Burke, in that purity can be logically 
defined only by its opposite (Burke 1966, 323).1 He also called it (Burke 1945, 
34–35) the “paradox of the absolute.” Moreover, purity is arguably sterile. Much is 
summed up in the very title of Mary Douglas’s anthropological classic Purity and 
Danger (1966). Purity goes with cleanliness, control, coherence, precision, and 
asexuality, whose antonyms are all dangerous but all essential to life and creativity. 
Hence, as another anthropologist, Edmund Leach, pointed out, the figure of the 
ascetic monk in religious traditions is balanced by that of the ecstatic shaman who 
has some kind of access to the supernatural powers that can bring peace, fertility, 
and blessings—but also disasters in the form of earthquakes, epidemics, and wars 
(Leach 2000, 348–51). 
The aim of this article is, by drawing on the meditations on purity by Burke, 
Douglas, and Leach, to facilitate discussion of various traditions of ethical order, 
including religious ones, without having to distinguish sharply between the reli-
gious and the secular. It will juxtapose two traditions of ethical order that function 
at a global level and interact with each other, Islam and humanitarianism; but will 
close by briefly considering other purisms so as to sketch a multidimensional map 
of rival ethical orders that try to impose their own definitions of purity, sometimes 
generating conflict and sometimes finding common ground. I shall argue finally 
that the common ground between humanitarianism and the major religious tradi-
tions is expanding.
Purity in islam
Islam since its foundation inherited a world in which all the major reli-
gious traditions were imbued with strong prohibitions and rites of purification 
surrounding the bodily functions of ingestion, evacuation, and sexual activity. 
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This applied even to Christianity, despite the priority that Jesus gave to purity of 
heart as opposed to ritual practices (Katz 2002, 3–4). Such a tenet necessarily 
entails an extensive overlap between moral and material values. We find in the 
Qur’an two important lexical fields concerned with purity. One is centered pri-
marily on the body but also on rectitude; the other on the intellectual principle 
of monotheism and the rejection of idolatry (into which category was subsumed 
Christian Trinitarianism as understood in the Qur’an).2 It is debatable to what 
extent there was a crossover between the two lexical fields, but if we see Islam 
as an historical offshoot of Judaism, it is helpful to adduce the precedent of the 
Hebrew Bible, where Mary Douglas has shown that idolatry was classed together 
with other defilements such as corpses, falsehood, betrayal, and shedding of blood 
(Douglas 1993, 152). Denial of God, polytheism, and apostasy have always been 
strongly rejected and condemned in Islam. One scholar of Islam identifies it as 
“the pure religion,” meaning that this was how its original followers saw it (Ring-
gren 1962). More precisely, Islam was especially explicit in asserting its purism, 
and the purity affirmed by foundational Islam pertained more to a prior ideal con-
dition than to a messianic future (Wansbrough 1978, 147–48).
Islam owed much of its expansionary success over the centuries to its ability 
to accommodate local belief systems without compromising the commitment to 
monotheism. Yet within the doctrines and practices of historical Islam we may 
identify tendencies of varying “puripetal force.” Of these, the most powerful today 
is Wahhabism,3 the version of Islam which has strengthened that force from its 
pact with Arab petromonarchies. This has mutated more widely into jihadi extrem-
ism among a small and toxic minority through interactions with the tribal Muslim 
periphery and its discontents (Ahmed 2013)—though there is no inevitable his-
torical connection between “tribal” Islam and political activism. 
Purity in philanthropy
The ideological system that I want to spotlight alongside Islam for pur-
poses of analysis is the whole sphere that we call philanthropy or humanitarian-
ism—considered as a complex of social relationships, irrespective of its historical 
roots in religious traditions. The word “charity” may also be used here provided 
that, for this purpose, its strong Christian associations are set aside, for it is one 
of the English words used to translate the Greek New Testament word for spiri-
tual love, agapē, the highest Christian virtue. Charity in a universal sense may be 
seen as grounded in compassion, the pitié that Rousseau saw as a restraint on our 
amour de soi. Charity at its most basic is a bodily act: extending a hand to a stricken 
traveler, or sharing food with a neighbor. All such acts imply an inequality between 
donor and beneficiary, which opens the way to political relations as soon as actions 
coalesce into institutions. Yet great efforts have been made to ring-fence areas of 
charitable activity as distinct from politics and commerce: examples are the Charities 
Acts in England and the French Law of Associations of 1901, and the recently fash-
ionable idea of “humanitarian space”—the scope for independent action available 
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in conflict zones (or not, as the case may be) to relief agencies, on the analogy of 
physical safe zones and corridors.
It is now a commonplace that charity and humanitarian aid have, and have 
always had, an inescapable political dimension in practice (Donini 2012). But 
this does not detract from the ideological power of the principle of ring-fencing, 
which amounts, for liberal Western society, to what the anthropologist Roy Rap-
paport has called an “ultimate sacred postulate” (1999, 263). The “space” allotted 
to charity is conceived as being unadulterated by either politics or economics. The 
holding of institutional religion at arm’s length from charity is more ambiguous. 
Organizations that combine religious and humanitarian goals have always been 
widespread and influential, and are still legal under most jurisdictions. Nowadays, 
however, under widely accepted codes of conduct, proselytizing among the recipi-
ents of aid, and religious discrimination by aid agencies within a given territory, are 
both prohibited as abuses of power. Hence overtly Evangelical aid agencies (such 
as the us-based Southern Baptists and Samaritan’s Purse) have become outliers in 
the Christian world whereas they used to be mainstream. 
And within the broader charitable sphere we may identify what I have called 
puripetal tendencies. One such tendency is exemplified by the demand of a recent 
author, Shawn Flanigan, that aid and Evangelism should be legally decoupled, 
and that international ngos seeking partnerships among local ngos should select 
only the secular ones (Flanigan 2010, 140, 145–46). This view, that the values 
of “development”—a euphemism for the now discredited term “moderniza-
tion”—are essentially inimical to religion, is probably widely held among many aid 
professionals, though it is seldom articulated with such candor. Philip Fountain 
diagnoses Flanigan’s assumption, that secular development values are neutral and 
superior, as arising from “the Enlightenment zeal for binary purifications” (Foun-
tain 2013, 20).
A puripetal tendency of great historical importance has been crystallized in 
the institutionalization of the International Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), 
founded by Henry Dunant and others in 1864, and in the specialized meaning 
given to the word “humanitarian” in the Geneva Conventions and other branches 
of International Humanitarian Law (ihl). Much confusion has been caused 
by ihl’s restrictive understanding of a word that is also used colloquially, often 
encompassing human rights and “development” and sometimes meaning no more 
than “compassionate.”4 Geneva law, embodied institutionally in the Swiss Govern-
ment and in duties delegated to the icrc, is mainly concerned with the protec-
tion of people in situations of conflict when they have lost their normal protector. 
“Within the humanitarian community,” write Michael Barnett and Janice Stein, 
“the icrc is routinely referred to as the ‘high priests,’ a designation that simulta-
neously mocks a holier-than-thou attitude while also paying respect to venerated 
status” (Barnett and Stein eds. 2012, 26). The icrc, as part of the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, is officially non-confessional, though the 
semiotics of the red cross and red crescent emblems has a complex history (Ben-
thall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 45–68). An important trend in debate about 
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humanitarianism today calls for a restoration of the original clarity of Dunant’s 
vision of aid givers as neutral third parties in the battlefield, as set out in his Un 
Souvenir de Solferino. But Rebecca Gill has convincingly shown that the history of 
modern relief aid was much more messy than the retrospective myth of Dunan-
tism allows. Before World War i, the red cross was better known in Britain as the 
blazon of its military ambulances and Vad (Voluntary Aid Detachment) than as 
the emblem of the Swiss committee, whose members were widely disparaged by 
British diplomats as sentimental utopianists. Only after that war did the icrc suc-
cessfully establish itself as the moral conscience of the Red Cross movement, and 
Dunant’s masterpiece was not available in English translation till 1947 (Gill 2013).
Médecins Sans Frontières, which had a turbulent relationship with the icrc for 
many years after its foundation in France in 1971, is loyal nonetheless to Dunantist 
principles of neutrality and independence; and after its expansion into a transna-
tional agency it has earned almost equal respect (Redfield 2013). It is as puripetal 
in its own way as the icrc, and satisfies many of the criteria of a faith-based organi-
zation (Benthall 2008, 96–107). 
I have already illustrated how the purism of humanitarianism can overlap with 
the purism of one religious tradition, Christianity; and it can do so in many differ-
ent ways, for there is a world of difference between the fundamentalist Southern 
Baptists and the uk-based Christian Aid, which has more in common with the 
non-confessional Oxfam. But the interface that I will review here in some detail is 
with Islam.
Islamic charity
The central concept in this interface between the two purisms is that of 
zakat, the Qur’anic tithe, which is literally central in that it is the third of the five 
“pillars of Islam,” an affirmation of faith as well as an act of social solidarity. The 
word is derived from the verb zakā, which means to purify, but also with connota-
tions of growth and increase. By giving up part of one’s wealth—in broad terms, 
one-fortieth of net assets per year—one purifies that portion which remains, and 
also oneself, through a restraint on one’s selfishness, greed, and imperviousness 
to the sufferings of others. Likewise, the beneficiary is purified from jealousy and 
hatred of the well-off. Zakat is mandatory, and if it is neglected no amount of 
prayer will be efficacious. It is distinguished from ṣadaqa, which is optional or vol-
untary, but closely associated with it: the Arabic ṣadaqa had connotations of moral 
rectitude. Zakat is conceived as the opposite of usurious interest or riba, which is 
essentially corrupting. The most important historical institutionalization of ṣadaqa 
was the waqf (plural: awqāf), the Islamic equivalent of the European charitable 
trust, which meant literally a “stopping” or “tying up” of property for good causes 
under legal guarantee.
All schools of Sunni Islam are agreed on the importance of zakat, which has 
inspired many idealistic tracts expounding its potential to generate a society free 
from the disadvantages of both capitalism and socialism, and linked to the casu-
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istic subtleties of “Islamic economics,” which unlike zakat is entirely a modern 
construct. There is in practice a wide variation ranging from the administration of 
zakat by the state, as in a few countries such as Pakistan, to informal payment of 
zakat to individuals whom one knows personally.
I will show how the interface between the two purisms is handled in different 
ways, with special reference to disaster relief in Asia by British Islamic charities and 
their counterparts in the Arabian Gulf. Marie Juul Petersen has elaborated a neat 
contrast between the two types of charitable ideology, characterizing the former as 
“secularizing Islam” and the latter as “sacralizing aid,” though she abstains from 
evaluating their operational effectiveness (Juul Petersen 2016). My own formu-
lation is similar to hers, but I would see both “secularizing” and “sacralizing” as 
forms of purity-seeking that come into conflict with each other. A third example I 
shall take, drawn from Indonesia, does not fit into Juul Petersen’s dichotomy and 
will be treated here as an intermediate case.
Islamic relief worldwide
Of the British Islamic charities, easily the largest is Islamic Relief World-
wide (irw). It would be enlightening to trace the exact process whereby conser-
vative interpretations of the Qur’anic zakat rules were replaced, in at least two 
respects, by the more liberal interpretation observed by irw. The first point is 
whether all in need are eligible to receive zakat funds, or only Muslims. The tra-
ditional view was “only Muslims,” and this rule is by no means extinct. But some 
time during the first eight years after the foundation of Islamic Relief in Britain in 
1984, the decision was made to extend its aid to all communities without distinc-
tion, and indeed to target that aid to those in greatest need. The change of view 
enabled this new charity not only to gain a favorable reputation in Britain and 
subsequently worldwide, but also to benefit from funding from the British gov-
ernment and European Community institutions. (Muslim Aid, the second larg-
est British Islamic charity, founded in 1985, followed suit later, in about 2003.) 
The test as to whether this principle of non-discrimination has been observed can 
only be set within the confines of each operational territory where there are mixed 
religions and ethnicities. In practice, all Muslim aid agencies devote most of their 
resources to working in Muslim-majority countries, which they justify by drawing 
attention to the high levels of deprivation and political unrest in large swathes of 
the Muslim world (De Cordier 2009).
The second adaptation to the modern charity environment has concerned the 
understanding of jihad. The seventh of the eight categories of beneficiary eligi-
ble for zakat, according to Qur’an 9.60, is those “in the way of God,” which is 
interpreted as meaning “those in jihad.” This is a highly equivocal term whose 
meaning always varies with its context. One sense of jihad is that it is a striving to 
overcome one’s own weaknesses of character; an important manifestation of this 
striving can be taking practical steps to alleviate the suffering of others. But the 
military sense of jihad has also survived the centuries, and some Islamic authorities 
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still maintain that it is admissible for zakat funds to be spent on military efforts in 
the cause of true religion.5 For this reason, scholars such as Timur Kuran have been 
able to argue that zakat is not the same as Christian charity, since a proportion of 
the resources which it raises can legitimately be spent not only on “good works” 
but on various other authorized purposes including the military defense of religion 
(Kuran 2004). It has thus been extremely important for irw, Muslim Aid, and the 
other British Muslim charities to display their unequivocal attachment to humani-
tarian values—nonviolence, and also abstention from “political activities” accord-
ing to the dictates of the Charity Commission of England and Wales, which has set 
out “red lines” (subtly changing over the years) that accredited charities have to 
steer clear of in their campaigning. (Current English charity law, however, like the 
historic Islamic rules of zakat, accommodates military objectives to some extent in 
that one of the charitable purposes permitted under the Charities Act 2011 is “the 
efficiency of the armed services of the Crown,” which includes the subsidy of offi-
cers’ messes.6) irw has claimed that it “intentionally and explicitly integrates Islam’s 
perspectives with professional relief and development” (Abuarqub 2010). 
A third decision made by irw was to refrain from any religious activities: 
Da’wa, or inviting others to Islam, is obligatory for each Muslim, always through 
reasoning rather than luring and coercion. But da’wa has very little to do with 
international development and should remain a separate activity from humani-
tarian work. Therefore, while it is important for ir to demonstrate and maintain 
its faith identity and meet the expectation of its religious donors, the primary 
focus of the organisation will always be the needs of the poor and vulnerable. 
 (Abuarqub 2010)
This resulted in a policy that has sometimes puzzled: an abstention from build-
ing or repairing mosques, whereas members of the Caritas family of Catholic 
aid agencies have been willing, on occasion, to repair damaged mosques on the 
grounds that they are cultural assets valuable to a suffering community.
irw’s efforts to balance competing principles have been well explained in a 
study by Victoria Palmer of the agency’s short-lived operation to assist unregis-
tered Rohingya refugees around Teknaf in the Cox’s Bazar District, the south-
ernmost point of mainland Bangladesh (Palmer 2011). In the summer of 2013, 
only some 30,000 refugees who had fled from persecution in the Rakhine State 
of Myanmar were registered with unhcr; between 200,000 and 500,000 were 
unregistered. Since Palmer’s field visit in 2008, their plight has deteriorated. In 
July 2012, the Bangladesh government not only decided to turn back these Mus-
lim refugees from its borders with Myanmar, but also ordered European ngos to 
suspend their services to unregistered refugees in the region. The result was (at the 
time of writing this) an increasingly serious crisis in shelter, public health, nutri-
tion, schooling, and law and order.7 
Palmer’s field visit took place two weeks after irw undertook the planning 
and management of a new unofficial camp, known as the Leda Camp, to which 
some 9,600 refugees were moved from Tal Camp, which had been condemned by 
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human rights groups as unsatisfactory. Funding came from the European Commis-
sion. msf had moved on and handed over its health care services to irw, which also 
took responsibility for water and sanitation, a feeding center for young children and 
mothers, and camp management, though the government was responsible for the 
camp as a whole and deliberately provided only a minimum of services in order to 
try to make camp life less attractive to prospective refugees. (irw left in June 2010 
and handed over to Muslim Aid.) Palmer examines critically the postulate of “cul-
tural proximity,” which proposes that faith-based organizations have an operational 
advantage when working with beneficiaries who are co-religionists. “Culture” in 
the current debates is in effect a euphemism for religion, but Palmer aptly draws 
attention to other commonalities—of language, diet, dress, and physical appear-
ance—between irw’s staff, almost entirely recruited in this case from the local area, 
and the refugees. Her conclusion (in which she is not alone) is that there is no auto-
matic advantage in cultural proximity, religious or otherwise: it has to be worked 
for through superior performance. While one should be careful not to generalize 
from the specific case of this refugee camp, which evidently presented particular 
difficulties, it is noteworthy that, according to Palmer, most of the 50 Muslim staff 
members (out of a total of 65) claimed that the religious character of irw was not a 
motivating factor for them, and some had transferred from the employment of msf. 
irw in Bangladesh was caught between two stools: regarded with suspicion 
politically by the secular government (which has generally been hospitable to every 
kind of ngo), and criticized by others as not Islamic enough. The question of 
mosques was specially significant: “echo [the European Community Humani-
tarian Office] prohibited the building of purpose-built mosques in Leda Camp 
(in line with their policy of not supporting religious institutions)” (Palmer 2011, 
103). irw designated some community centers as alternative spaces, but they were 
inadequate: far too small, with no pulpit, no mihrab (niche) showing the direction 
of Mecca, no carpet, no loudspeaker for the call to prayer, and no nearby water 
facilities for the obligatory ablutions. “It is very much a shaming issue for us,” the 
project coordinator told Palmer; “We are Muslims, our name is also in the name of 
Islam, but there is no mosque.”
Any aid agency that takes on the responsibility of running a refugee camp 
runs into the problem that they are almost by definition authoritarian institu-
tions—Agier (2010) uses the phrase “humanitarian government”—and even in 
the nearby camps for un-registered refugees it was found by a Danish fact-finding 
team that until 2008 they were run by a mafia system (Danish Immigration 
SerVice 2011, 21). 
My own field experience of irw’s work in Asia, and its participation in recon-
struction in Aceh, Indonesia, after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, showed it 
in a favorable light, especially with regard to its rebuilding of houses and schools. 
But this success seemed largely due to its having committed on a relatively small 
scale (compared to the over-extension by some larger agencies which led to costly 
humiliation) and to its effective management practices. The religious motiva-
tion was there in the background, however, engendering an impressive solidarity 
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among their staff, and also facilitating cooperation with other faith-based aid agen-
cies, cafod and Latter Day Saints Humanitarian Services, which found it difficult 
to operate in an almost entirely Muslim society and entrusted irw with their funds 
for rehousing (Benthall 2008). In 2008 irw was not yet a member of the Lon-
don-based Disasters Emergency Committee. A year later, it became clear that irw 
had been accepted as a leader among British aid agencies when its general manager 
spoke on television after massive floods in Pakistan, appealing on behalf of all the 
members of the Disasters Emergency Committee—no doubt because irw was the 
best equipped of them to take the lead in a disaster in that country. 
I would also argue that, apart from the contribution that irw makes to Brit-
ish overseas aid, it has been a force for integration within Britain itself, following 
the lead of Christian agencies such as Christian Aid and cafod, which are held in 
great respect even by those who are critical of traditional religious leaders. Though 
founded by Egyptians, who in general have not played a prominent role in the 
British charitable scene, irw has achieved an astute, if sometimes contentious, bal-
ance between the two purisms of Islam and humanitarianism, but with a leaning 
towards the latter. It has even been able to do the same in the United States, where 
several other Islamic charities ran into serious problems after 9/11 (aclu 2009).
The muhammadiyah
Another factor that facilitated irw’s early and energetic response in Indo-
nesia to the tsunami was its prior links with the two leading Indonesian Islamic 
organizations, the reformist or modernist Muhammadiyah, founded in Jogjakarta 
by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912, and the more traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (nu). In 
general, the domestic Indonesian contribution to humanitarian relief after the tsu-
nami was grossly underrated by Western evaluators, but recently it has begun to be 
documented.8 
Unfamiliar to most Western commentators, the record of the Muhammadiyah 
in humanitarianism goes back much earlier in time than the late twentieth century 
“Islamic resurgence.” It is better known in Indonesia for its network of schools, 
universities, and health and welfare institutions—some 11,700 in number (Fauzia 
2013, 264). But its subsidiary pk—standing for Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum, 
“Assistance for the Relief of Public Suffering”—was first founded by Muhammadi-
yah members in 1918 as an independent organization to provide emergency ser-
vices for victims of the eruption of Mount Kelud. Relief work was subsequently 
undertaken for victims of floods, famines, epidemics, and earthquakes. Amelia 
Fauzia, the historian of Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia, records that the early 
work of the pku was influenced by “Al-Ma’un theology”—which alludes to Surah 
107 of the Qur’an, “The neighborly assistance,” a stern warning to those who fall 
short in their charitable obligations; but also more practically by the examples of 
the Al-Azhar waqf in Cairo, of Christian orphanages, poorhouses and hospitals, 
and of the Red Cross. The secretary of the pku wrote in 1929:
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Muhammadiyah’s pku works for and assists the alleviation of public suffering 
without looking at other parties’ work, and without serving other people who 
want to obtain public influence. It works solely because of the instruction of 
Islamic teachings brought by our Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and 
following his tradition. So, Muhammadiyah’s pku aims to be like an oasis that is 
pure (jernih) and clean, located in a place accessible to everyone no matter what 
nationality and religion they have. It is there for whoever wishes to drink the 
water as long as they do not deliberately destroy the stream and close the oasis. 
Muhammadiyah’s pku does not aim to act like a dragnet to attract people to 
become Muslim or join Muhammadiyah, but it solely fulfils the Islamic obliga-
tions for all nations, irrespective of religion.9
Though one of the motivations for the original foundation of the Muhammadi-
yah had been to provide a counterbalance to Christian missionary activity, the pku 
subordinated da‘wa to humanitarian principles and was fully committed to non-dis-
crimination, as also to cooperation with the Dutch colonial authorities—for which 
it was criticized by Islamic hard-liners. Since 1939, however, according to Fauzia, 
the inclusive principle became attenuated and was later comprehensively replaced 
by an exclusive concern for the welfare of the Muslim umma. This change was cor-
related with the ascendancy of what is often called a “puritan” (or “Salafi”) form of 
Sunni Islam, which was always strongly represented in the Muhammadiyah, notably 
in its opposition to syncretism and takhayul (“superstitions” such as magical heal-
ing), but which never took on the political colors of Wahhabism such as became 
dominant in Saudi Arabia. The Muhammadiyah always included a strong modern-
izing and outward-looking tendency. The movement, which claims a membership 
of some twelve million, is currently split between a conservative backlash, especially 
with regard to the role of women, and projects for revitalization (Van Bruines-
sen 2012; Burhani 2013). The anthropologist Mitsuo Nakamura has noted that 
the Muhammadiyah has been successful in “purifying” the world view and practice 
of Javanese Muslims from kejawen, that is to say “Javanese-ness,” including pre-
Islamic elements both indigenous and Hindu-Buddhist; but the result may be a 
spiritual or cultural “dryness” that needs to be refreshed (Nakamura 2012, 331). 
Much of the debate within the Muhammadiyah is in fact framed around rival ideas 
of religious purity: whether cultivation of the self or good deeds should have pri-
ority. Nakamura argues that the ethical principle of ikhlāṣ, the name of a Qur’anic 
Surah,10 embraces both (Nakamura 2012, 200–201).
In the Muslim world as a whole, as noted above, we find a wide variety of 
different implementations of zakat—varying from full incorporation in the tax 
system to informal giving to personal acquaintances. The entire spectrum of pos-
sibilities is found in Indonesia, and has been the subject of energetic debates. 
In recent years the tension between hierarchic state control and civil society has 
assumed warlike proportions (Fauzia 2013, 248), and government efforts to chan-
nel Muslim citizens’ zakat payments into official funds have met with resistance. In 
1978 the Muhammadiyah founded its own zakat institution, Bapelurzam (Badan 
Pelaksuna Urusan Zakat Muhammadiyah), in the Kendal region of northern 
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Java. Insisting that zakat should be given to institutions rather than to the poor, 
it is committed to non-discrimination and accountability (Fauzia 2013, 203–10). 
However, according to a survey carried out in 2004, 45 percent of Indonesian 
Muslims claimed to pay their zakat directly to individuals, and 51 percent through 
local zakat committees (Fauzia 2013, 244).
In 2007 the Muhammadiyah’s disaster relief operations, which had risen to 
prominence after the 2004 tsunami, were brought together as the Muhammadi-
yah Disaster Management Centre (mdmc), which cooperates with every kind of 
national and international organization. Among its strengths one may single out 
two. First, in a country of 17,000 islands, 30 percent of whose roads are unpaved, 
mdmc has been able to draw on the Muhammadiyah’s huge network of branches 
to scale up a community’s response at the grassroots to an emergency and thus to 
increase the efficacy of external aid (Husein 2012). Second, mdmc’s knowledge 
of local cultures gives them a sensitivity to varying interpretations of disasters. 
According to Mohammad Rokib, the conviction of Muhammadiyah members that 
a disaster such as the Mount Merapi eruptions of 2010 was a test of moral and 
spiritual strength—as opposed to mere bad luck, or a punishment for past sins—
came to be a source of social cohesion, both in recovery from the disaster and in 
practical steps taken to mitigate its recurrence in future. Moreover, whereas pro-
fessional psychosocial counselors left the area soon after the immediate crisis, the 
Muhammadiyah provided teachers, preachers, and prayer leaders to help survivors 
overcome long-term post-traumatic shock (Rokib 2012).
In its scale and experience the Muhammadiyah should be better known glob-
ally as a model for Islamic social activism.11 The strength of the Muhammadiyah 
and that of its slightly larger sister organization, the nu, are unique in the Islamic 
world, and the Muhammadiyah is specially notable for the density of its nation-
wide networks and degree of administrative rationalization and internal democ-
racy. Their ethos may be distinguished from that of the welfarist networks which 
emerged in the Middle East and North Africa under the inspiration of the Mus-
lim Brothers of Egypt, who always commingled welfarism, religion, and politi-
cal opposition. Martin van Bruinessen has suggested that the Muhammadiyah’s 
pattern of organization is partly due historically to the demands imposed by the 
Dutch law of associations during the colonial period (email, 12 May 2013). I sug-
gest that the Muhammadiyah has realized a remarkably firm congruence between 
Islamic purism and humanitarian purism.12 
The cordon sanitaire of saudi charities
Reverting to what Juul Petersen calls the sacralizing of aid by Gulf-based 
Islamic charities, we will take as examples the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
(wamy), and the International Islamic Relief Organization (iiro or iirosa), both 
based in Saudi Arabia and both affiliated to the Muslim World League. A third 
major Saudi Islamic charity, Al Haramain, was closed down in 2004 after allega-
tions of supporting terrorism which remain contentious, since it is probable that 
benthall: puripetal force in the charitable field | 41
the main offenders were local operatives who were given latitude by ineffective 
head office controls to commit nefarious acts (Bokhari et al. 2014).
In August 2012, wamy announced a program of relief and rehabilitation for 
the Rohingya minority of Myanmar, victims of abuse including murder, rape, and 
forcible expulsion.13 wamy was following the lead of King Abdullah of Saudi Ara-
bia, who had recently allocated us$50 million for aid to the Rohingya. The head 
of wamy coupled his announcement with a plea to the international community 
to defend the Rohingya’s human rights, calling specially on Arab and Islamic 
countries and lamenting that the Western media had been largely silent about 
the massacre of Muslims in Myanmar. Western governments and even Aung San 
Suu Kyi had turned a blind eye. (This was before President Obama’s speech in 
November 2012.) 
wamy, founded in 1972, claims to have branches in fifty-six countries and affili-
ations with some five hundred youth organizations all over the world. It is an 
educational and humanitarian charity whose declared aims include preserving 
“the identity of Muslim youth” and helping them overcome the problems they 
face in modern society; introducing Islam to non-Muslims “in its purest form as a 
comprehensive system and way of life”; and promoting dialogue between Muslim 
and non-Muslim societies.14 What is seen in Saudi Arabia as the purest form of 
Islam appears to outsiders as a strict variant that adheres to literalist readings of 
the Qur’an, emphasizes dress, bodily deportment, and gender segregation, and 
excludes popular traditions such as the cult of local saints. As a vehicle of the Han-
bali school of Sunni Islam, wamy has set itself up to compete with laxist, Christian, 
and secular influences, as well as with the Shia denomination of Islam which hap-
pens to be dominant in several petroleum-producing regions of the Middle East. 
In common with many other humanitarian institutions in the Gulf States, both 
governmental and private or semi-private, wamy gives de facto preference in allo-
cation of its resources to Muslim populations.
wamy’s two principal commitments are to youth education, including practical 
warnings about the dangers of addiction, integrated with religious teaching, and to 
the care of thousands of orphans—a category of beneficiary that is invariably given 
special attention by Islamic charities (Benthall 2012, 79–81). wamy’s ability to 
intervene after disasters has been much reduced by measures taken by Gulf govern-
ments in response to the “war on terror” (Lacey and Benthall eds. 2014); and 
in any case none of its programs have as far as I know been the subject of serious 
research. But linguistic analysis of a speech by the secretary general published in 
English in 2005 gives a revealing hint of the wamy world view. Looking back on 
the year, he recalls the “natural disasters” that “emphasize the need for cooperation 
among nations to face the challenges of time, and thus ease the sufferings of the 
masses of the world”: the Indian Ocean tsunami, refugee movements in Darfur, 
famine in Niger. Finally, just before earthquakes in south Asia, he mentions: “It 
pains me immensely to illustrate the tragic events that rocked the London city sub-
way, Sharm-el-Sheikh, and more recently Bali, which resulted in great loss of inno-
cent lives” (Report of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth 2005, 8). The secretary 
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general’s train of thought could impel us to adapt for the Salafi context the theory 
advanced by some sociologists that cultural categories are routinely “naturalized” 
as part of a strategy to dominate (see for example Bourdieu 2003, 105). “Islam is 
without flaw,” the subtext seems to run; “the perpetrators of the ‘tragic events’ of 
2006 claimed to be Muslims; therefore rather than allocating responsibility we will 
characterize them as destructive forces of nature.”
iirosa, founded in 1978, more pragmatic than wamy but still deeply grounded 
in Salafi Islam, was particularly active in Afghanistan in the 1980s and later in the 
former Eastern Bloc during the 1990s, when it saw its role as repairing the divisive 
damage done by Communism to the Muslim religion and culture. In a largely 
critical interpretation of Saudi charities, the francophone author Abdel-Rahman 
Ghandour described them (2002, 242) as implementing a cordon sanitaire to 
maintain ideological influence on the Middle East. The iiro in its heyday was the 
most powerful of these charities, strongly committed to “reislamization” (i‘ādat 
aslamah), that is, protecting the identity of Muslim communities from the twin 
evils of secularization and Christian proselytism. Material relief was sometimes 
used, for instance in the Bosnian conflict of the early 1990s, to undertake da‘wa or 
spiritual relief (Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 142–44)—for instance, by distributing 
militantly anti-Christian videocassettes.
In the 1990s the iiro developed innovative fundraising techniques and opened 
communications with Western humanitarian organizations through the energy 
of one of its co-founders, Dr. Farid Yaseen Quraishi. In 1996, however, he was 
dismissed and iirosa reverted to a discretion more palatable to its Saudi spon-
sors. After 9/11 and the “designation” or blacklisting of two of its branches in 
the Philippines and Indonesia, it went through a lean period and its annual bud-
get, formerly of the order of $85 million, is thought to have been at least halved. 
More recently it has undertaken a revival: not yet through implementing large-
scale emergency programs, but through reaching out energetically to interact with 
environmentalists and agronomists, also with diplomats and non-Muslim aid agen-
cies. In 2013 iirosa seemed to be struggling to escape from isolation, as in the 
1990s under Quraishi. For instance, a regular columnist in its magazine Egatha 
presented futuristic ideas such as the application to emergency relief operations of 
artificial intelligence, and the quantification of the needs of each hundred victims 
of a disaster as Relief Units (Ezz Eldin 2011; 2012). The relationship with inter-
national humanitarianism was still awkward, though likely to be eased in future by 
the search in the West for so-called “new humanitarian donors” to compensate for 
pressures on aid budgets.
Peering into purity of motiVes
But iirosa has come up against another form of purism: that currently 
espoused by the us Government and judiciary with regard to humanitarian activ-
ity. Whereas iirosa’s head office, as opposed to two of its former branches,15 is not 
“designated” as a terrorist entity, it was still in early 2015 regarded with suspicion 
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in the us, for the us Government places high priority on probing into the purity of 
motives as opposed to that of effects.
Imagine a major earthquake such as the one that hit the Kashmir region in 
2005. One voluntary association, let us call it Al-Aleph,16 has the best local knowl-
edge to reach isolated mountain villages to bring help to survivors. It happens to 
be affiliated to a group that has been designated by the us as a terrorist organiza-
tion. You are the leader of a foreign rescue unit with technical resources but no 
knowledge of the region. Is it your priority to cooperate with the voluntary asso-
ciation to help search for survivors, dig them out from the rubble, give them medi-
cal attention, and secure a proper burial for the dead? Most people would answer 
“yes,” and indeed in 2005 international agencies were quite willing to cooperate 
with such a group; but if you have any connections with the us you would now 
risk being prosecuted in the criminal courts for giving “material support” to ter-
rorism, which is considered equivalent to terrorism itself and can be punished by a 
life sentence in prison. 
Let us take another hypothetical example, a hospital called Al-Ba’ located in 
the Gaza Strip. It specializes, let us say, in obstetrics and mother and baby care. It 
provides its services without any enquiry into the religion or political affiliations 
of patients, that is to say it functions on the basis of need—with graduated fees 
depending on the patient’s ability to pay, sometimes without charging any fee at 
all. But it is deemed by the enemies of Hamas to be part of the Hamas network on 
the grounds that it is controlled by, or affiliated with, an Islamic charity. Whether 
the supposition is justified is another matter. This is a delicate matter and according 
to research in which I have participated, until the split between Hamas and Fatah 
in 2007 the Islamic charities in the Palestinian Territories were much less politi-
cized than the Israeli and American counter-terrorist advisers believed—though 
by 2013 such a hospital has been much more likely to be directly controlled by the 
Hamas government in Gaza (Schaeublin 2012).17 If the hospital were turning 
away patients who rejected Hamas’s political ideology, or using medical care as a 
way of recruiting Hamas supporters, then it would probably be more justifiable 
for the Al-Ba’ hospital to be blacklisted, and for any donor who sent it money to 
risk criminal prosecution. But I have hypothesized that the evidence is that Al-Ba’ 
provides its services “without adverse distinction,” as the Geneva Conventions put 
it18—thus making it eligible for protection as a humanitarian institution. Current 
us law, however, will have none of this. It is less interested in the actual provision 
of humanitarian services than in the question of whether or not the motives of the 
hospital managers and its donors are tainted. To which it adds the doctrine of fun-
gibility or convertibility, which holds that $10,000 sent to Al-Ba’ hospital liberates 
money that Hamas would otherwise have spent on medicines, so that it can spend 
$10,000 on bombs, with the result that the hospital’s entire medical activities are 
deemed to be beyond redemption.
Actually the us Government and Islamic ‘ulama’ would be in agreement as to 
the all-importance of purity of intention—nīyah in Arabic. The us Government 
goes further and argues that even if one’s intention is pure, one is still liable to 
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be criminalized if one allows one’s acts to be corrupted by the intentions of oth-
ers. Proof of this is the much criticized decision of the us Supreme Court in 2010 
(Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project) which makes it illegal for a peacebuilding 
or mediating ngo to try to persuade a terrorist organization to put down its weap-
ons and have trust in the political process. Why? Because it could be lending that 
terrorist organization legitimacy. Yet in Northern Ireland, peace would surely not 
have come without decades of work by church groups, women’s groups, youth 
groups, and others to take the initiative away from the paramilitaries. 
One danger of clamping down on decent Islamic charities is that a humanitar-
ian vacuum is left that can be filled by extremists, including those of the Al-Qaeda 
persuasion. Ultimately we need to form balanced judgments on the basis of out-
comes, which I suggest are more important than purity of intention—especially 
because, despite the best efforts of our law courts to “read” the states of mind 
of individuals, this is not an exercise where certainty is possible. The uk Charity 
Commission’s approach to problems relating to terrorist abuse of charities seems 
to strike a sensible balance, based on the concepts of risk reduction and propor-
tionality and on the core principle that funds raised for charitable purposes must 
be spent faithfully for those purposes and protected from abuse. Purity is ascribed 
to the verifiable conditions on which the funds were solicited (generally in the 
context of concessions by the taxation authorities).
Unresolved tensions are currently in play between the international ngo sector, 
which observes that an overreaction against Islamic charities has put at legal risk 
the operations of ngos in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia (in 
addition to the physical risks of working in conflict zones), and the us Govern-
ment position which dominates the policies of the Financial Action Task Force 
(fatf)—a powerful organization under the oecd, effectively controlling the com-
pliance procedures of the international banking system.19 
Interlocking spheres
I have chosen to describe and interpret the relationship between the pur-
isms of humanitarianism and Islam. Figure 1 is intended to schematize the rela-
tionship between these two spheres, each rough-hewn at their edges but including 
concentrations of puripetal force. The sphere of Christianity could be added with 
ease in this scheme, embracing a wide variety of contemporary puripetal movements 
including conservative Evangelicalism, the Eastern Orthodox Churches, and con-
servative tendencies in Roman Catholicism—though we may go further back in time 
to include the Reformation, the Religious Society of Friends, and Unitarianism.20 
The interactions are multidimensional. For instance, a key concept in Christian 
moral theology is service—in Greek, diakonīa. The social teaching of the Gülen 
Movement—founded in Turkey but now markedly transnational—has been real-
ized in such organizations as the Istanbul-based international relief organization 
Kimse Yok Mu (“Is there anybody there?”).21 It is consistent with modern inter-
pretations of the Qur’anic zakat prescriptions, but gives much more emphasis 
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to the concept of hizmet—a common Turkish word meaning “service,” used in 
both secular and religious contexts—which is indeed an alternative name for the 
movement (Harrington 2011, 11–13). Arabic Bibles translate the Greek diakonīa 
as khidma, which does not appear in the Qur’an (unlike the term ‘abd, “slave,” 
whose derivative ‘ibāda is used to signify devotion to God). It is as if the intention 
has been to purify Islam of the contentious resonances of jihad and (in some anti-
Muslim circles) zakat, with the unacknowledged aid of New Testament theology.22
The main pressure points today between the spheres of institutional religion 
and the sphere of humanist ethics are at the level of individual autonomy: where 
theological principles are brought to bear on legislation concerning sexual-
ity, reproduction, and euthanasia—issues that secular liberals prefer to regard as 
belonging to the domain of individual choice, provided only that the vulnerable 
are protected (Perreau-Saussine 2012, 137). The chosen stand of the Abrahamic 
monotheisms against the tide of secular humanitarianism will be to defend the 
purity of theological principles, variously formulated. Yet with regard to issues of 
social justice and responses to disasters and extreme deprivation, the points of ten-
sion are now reduced. And all these systems of thought face the same dilemma: 
that they are in practice subordinate to the ungentle and impure realities of the 
“structurally violent” world whose sufferings they hope to alleviate.23 In some 
limited compensation for the sharpness of these class and sectarian divisions, I 
would argue that there is a significant convergence between the institutions of 
international humanitarianism and religion—exemplified in the work of Islamic 
Relief Worldwide and the Muhammadiyah, Caritas, and Christian Aid—or, in 
figure 1. This figure is a visualization of the quest for purities as analogous to competing 
gravitational forces. The Dunantism of the ICRC and the Salafi trend are forms of intense 
puripetalism within their respective spheres. The figure could be expanded multidimension-
ally to include other religious and quasi-religious movements, and various schools of law.
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schematic terms, an enlargement of the area of overlap between competing purip-
etal forces. Which gives some grounds for hope.
Notes
*I am most grateful to the editors and all the Asia Research Institute team for stimulus and 
comments on drafts, to Martin van Bruinessen for advice on Indonesia, and to Emanuel Schaeu-
blin and Christian Lekon for commenting on a near final draft. The article is republished with 
permission as Chapter 9 of Islamic Charities and Islamic Humanism in Troubled Times (Man-
chester University Press, 2016).
1. I was led to Burke’s writings on purity by Grano and Zagacki, who analyze the reopen-
ing of the New Orleans Superdome for Monday Night Football in September 2006 as a puri-
fication ritual to purge post-Katrina guilt, because in the aftermath of the hurricane “poor, 
predominantly African American evacuees [had been] cast as an animalistic mass” in the same 
space (Grano and Zagacki 2011, 202).
2. The key Arabic roots of the former are ṭ-h-r, ṭ-ī-b, and z-k-t (Katz 2002); of the sec-
ond, kh-l-ṣ (Ringgren 1962), as in the title of Surah 112 of the Qu’ran, Al-Ikhlāṣ, “The Purity 
of Faith.” For further analysis see Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2003, 24–25); see also 
GauVain (2013). Neither he nor Katz make a connection between the two lexical fields, but 
there appears to be such a connection with the root ṭ-h-r in Q. 3:55.
3. Wahhabis generally prefer to call themselves Salafis—an extremely protean term. The 
original Salafiyya of the late nineteenth century, based in Egypt, had modernizing aspects, for 
instance in insisting that Muslims free themselves from the “imitation” (taqlīd) of traditional 
authority. Samira Haj has argued persuasively that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1702/3–1791/2), the 
founder of the Wahhabi movement and its alliance with the house of Sa‘ud, when viewed 
in his historical context “differed from other reformers both in his condemnatory attitude 
toward certain practices [such as the veneration of saints and shrines] and his reliance on force 
to correct them. However, neither his alliance with the Sa‘udi tribal chiefs nor his restrictive 
attitudes can be attributed, as mainstream scholarship does, to a violent, fundamentalist, or 
traditional strain in Islamic thought” (Haj 2009, 65–66). Yet her study confirms that the 
Wahhabiya was essentially a purification movement, the pursuit of ikhlāṣ (Haj 2009, 51).
4. A lucid history of the word “humanitarian” is given in DaVies (2012).
5. See for example Al-Qaradawi (n.d., 57–73). Similarly, the fourth category of eligible ben-
eficiary, “those whose hearts are made to incline to truth,” can be understood to legitimize 
spending on proselytism and religious propaganda; and the fifth category, “captives,” to legiti-
mize support for anti-colonial movements or Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim tyrannies.
6. For example, the Royal Air Force Coningsby Officers’ Mess, registered charity no. 
1137559.
7. Refugees International field report, “Rohingya in Bangladesh,” 30 October 2012.
8. See Radcliffe (2007) for early recognition of this, and Husein (2012). 
9. Translated from the Indonesian and cited by Fauzia (2013, 152). 
10. See note 2.
11. In November and December 2012, the Muhammadiyah organized a large centennial 
research conference at one of its universities, in Malang, Eastern Java, reviewing “a renewed 
identity for its post-centennial era.” Remarkably, the convenors allowed and encouraged can-
did criticism of the organization as well as praise for its achievements and academic analysis—
recognizing new challenges such as the threat of infiltration by violent extremists.
12. These two important organizations are not alone in providing humanitarian services 
in Indonesia, for “… [W]e can assume that there is a wide ideological spectrum of Islamic 
humanitarian agencies that have emerged in response to communal conflicts, and that their 
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political orientations are as varied as the social and educational backgrounds of their found-
ers and volunteers” (Latief 2012, 106). Jihadi groups in Indonesia such as Laskar Jihad have 
followed a mixed agenda of religious militancy and humanitarian relief, but not to the same 
extent as some similar groups in, for instance, Pakistan.
13. See Ghazanfar Ali Khan, “wamy seeks further measures to help Myanmar Muslims,” 
Arab News, 26 August 2012, http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2012/08/wamy-seeks 
-further-measures-to-help.html (accessed 11 April 2016). 
14. See http://www.wamy.co.uk/index.php?sub=subpageandmod=about.
15. The two former branches were in the Philippines and Indonesia. Given that Saudi soci-
ety is hierarchic, the situation seems anomalous. 
16. Pseudonyms have been used here for organizations in order to draw attention to the 
issues of principle that are raised, irrespective of ethnographic data which may be contested. 
17. As for the West Bank, the actual outcome was that in 2013 the new Fatah-controlled zakat 
committees had sacrificed most of the trust, and funding flows, built up over many years before 
2007 by the until then decentralized, and relatively unpoliticized, zakat committees which the 
pa and Fatah decided in 2007, under pressure from the us Government, to dismantle.
18. See Additional Protocol ii (1977), Article 18. 
19. For sustained coverage of these issues, see the website of the Charity and Security Net-
work, Washington, dc: www.charityandsecurity.org.
20. I must leave others to test the applicability of the model to other ideological move-
ments, both religious and political—some of them highly contentious, especially where Juda-
ism and Israel are concerned. But here we may note the importance of another ideological 
sphere, that of jurisprudence, which impacts on humanitarianism and charities but is also 
bound up in religious teaching through Halakha, Shariah, and ecclesiastical law.
21. The name was inspired by the call made to identify survivors in the rubble after an 
earthquake.
22. Michael Feener points out, however, that in Indonesia and some other postcolonial 
contexts, Christian diakonīa has been viewed by many Muslims as a form of enticement to 
lead Muslims astray (email, 2013). I have not come across this pejorative association of the 
word in Arab contexts.
23. Key texts for understanding the general crisis of humanitarianism include Donini 
(2012), Fassin (2012), and Duffield (2001). I have tried myself to analyze the “stable system” 
or disaster–media–aid nexus, whereby representations of misery in the South are turned into 
consumables for the North, which reciprocates with aid flows (Benthall 2010, ix–xxvii).
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